Natural Diplomatic Hub

This picture carries not only the footsteps of a multipolar order but also the risk of diplomatic relations turning into a deadlock. In this complex equation, Türkiye, rather than leaning on a single bloc, is trying to carve out its own path through finely tuned maneuvers between different power centers. It calls to mind the legend of the Gordion Knot.

The ancient capital of Phrygia, Gordion, is located today within the district boundaries of Polatlı, Ankara. In Gordion, the legendary knot cut by Alexander the Great’s sword symbolized a radical intervention in the face of an impasse. Today, Türkiye, still rooted in these lands, represents a similar move in global diplomacy: questioning traditional alliances, using military power as a diplomatic lever, and pursuing “strategic autonomy.” Yet unlike Alexander’s sharp sword, this move is achieved through the pen and the wheel of production.

Rather than drawing the sword as Alexander once did to sever the knot, Ankara in the 2020s seeks to untangle the tangled geopolitics with balance, negotiation, and cooperation. “Strategic autonomy” — a line that makes decisions without severing ties with NATO and the EU, while simultaneously forging transactional relations with Russia, the Gulf, and Asia — is a key term in today’s foreign policy lexicon for Türkiye.

Ankara has translated its current foreign policy posture from academic-based theories into ambitious slogans like the “Century of Türkiye.” This twenty-first-century foreign policy transformation offers a complex reality beyond traditional narratives. Behind the rhetoric of “Century of Türkiye” and strategic autonomy, critics point to significant economic vulnerabilities, democratic backsliding, and structural contradictions; yet, Türkiye continues to strengthen its position. When Ankara’s stance on the global stage is assessed through objective data rather than success stories alone, a more realistic picture emerges.

Paradigm: Balances

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s motto “The world is bigger than five” is both a challenge to the structure of the United Nations Security Council and a call for a multipolar order; his 2024 UN General Assembly address carried the same emphasis. This rhetoric provides the political framework for Ankara’s project — not necessarily to rewrite the rules, but to bend them in its own favor. However, the practical translation of this rhetoric is complex. Some observers see it as a Realism versus Idealism dilemma. Marc Pierini of Carnegie Europe notes: “Türkiye’s calls for global justice are legitimate, but its growing closeness to Russia and China erodes relations with its Western partners.”

Experts describe Erdoğan’s grand gestures and strong rhetoric as tools designed to enable Türkiye to exert influence beyond its weight at minimal cost — highlighting the performative nature of this approach.

Even so, in 2023, Türkiye’s reform proposal at the UN General Assembly was supported by 57 countries, despite the influence of the five permanent powers.

From the expert community’s perspective, Carnegie Europe points out that this quest for autonomy is tested by economic vulnerabilities and channels of dependency on Russia (such as the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and natural gas imports). The Brookings Institution notes that the image of a “difficult ally” within the alliance comes with costs. Analyses from Chatham House also note that Ankara’s multipolar vision is riddled with contradictions due to institutional limits and energy dependence — yet, this vision continues to resonate with a growing number of countries and blocs worldwide.

Hard Power and Technology

Although Türkiye’s $7.2 billion defense industry export figure appears impressive, its share in the global defense market remains limited. The $2 billion UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) deal signed with the UAE is significant, yet considering Türkiye’s total exports of around $250 billion, the defense sector’s economic impact is relatively modest.

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war showcased the global impact of unmanned systems, including the Bayraktar TB2; Azerbaijan’s ability to break the status quo in 44 days became a “proof of concept” for Türkiye’s defense industry. However, serious studies emphasize that victory came through an integrated doctrine — combining electronic warfare, artillery, loitering munitions, and intelligence — rather than drones alone revolutionizing the battlefield.

Bayraktar TB2 UAVs proved game-changing in both Libya and Karabakh. Yet, defense spending reached 2.8% of GDP in 2023 (compared to NATO’s average of 1.74%). Meanwhile, despite Türkiye’s legal rights, U.S. CAATSA sanctions resulted in its removal from the F-35 program and operational restrictions on S-400 systems. These setbacks did not derail the “hard power” strategy.

At the same time, Ankara’s military-political support along the Libya–Eastern Mediterranean axis paved the way for the 2019 Türkiye–Libya maritime jurisdiction agreement. This move made the EastMed pipeline design geopolitically contentious and heightened regional tensions.

Mediation Diplomacy

Türkiye’s policy of balance during the Ukraine war brought short-term diplomatic prestige but has raised questions about its long-term sustainability. Its mediating role in the Black Sea Grain Corridor agreement was indeed a commendable achievement.

However, the costs of this success should not be overlooked. Türkiye’s democratic backsliding, its relations with Russia, and growing friction with NATO allies increase the risk of long-term diplomatic isolation.

When the Ukraine war began, Ankara invoked the Montreux Convention to close the straits to warships and, together with the UN, mediated the Black Sea Grain Initiative; the corridor enabled nearly 33 million tons of shipments in 2022–23. Russia’s withdrawal in 2023 demonstrated that Türkiye’s mediation capacity can still be constrained by the other party’s threshold of interest.

Energy and Mutual Dependence

The flow of gas to Europe via TANAP and TurkStream gives Türkiye leverage. However, the build–own–operate (BOO) model of Rosatom at the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant fuels debate over strategic dependency. The commissioning of the first unit has slipped to 2025, with sub-system testing still ongoing. Ankara, meanwhile, is seeking balance by holding talks with the U.S., South Korea, and China for its second and third nuclear plants.

Trans-Caspian (Middle Corridor) traffic reached 2.8 million tons in 2024; while the World Bank’s cautious scenario for 2030 is around 11 million tons, regional states are voicing more ambitious targets of 15 million tons.

Türkiye is steadily pursuing its strategy of transforming its geography into a central player in energy supply security. TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) delivers Azerbaijani gas to Europe, playing a key role in the continent’s energy diversification (with an annual capacity of 16 bcm). The TurkStream project with Russia (31.5 bcm annually) represents a complex relationship of mutual dependence.

In the Eastern Mediterranean, ambitious moves under the “Blue Homeland” doctrine — including seismic survey vessels and the maritime jurisdiction agreement with Libya — as well as nuclear energy projects (Akkuyu, planned Sinop plant) demonstrate a proactive stance in energy geopolitics. Economic diplomacy is reinforced by trade agreements (such as the UK–Türkiye Trade Agreement) and investments, particularly in Africa.

New Partnerships

At the inaugural meeting of the Türkiye–UAE High-Level Strategic Council in Abu Dhabi, seven agreements were signed; investments, industrial cooperation, and advanced technology projects align closely with Ankara’s search for financing. At the UK–Türkiye Islamic Finance Forum in London, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between TKKB and UK Export Finance. Islamic finance events held in Istanbul with Malaysia brought Türkiye’s claim to “ethical and inclusive” finance to the forefront.

In the private sector, a four-way fintech agreement between Trendyol, Baykar, ADQ, and Ant International aims to integrate e-commerce, payment, and security technologies; indicating sustained global investor interest in Türkiye’s digital economy.

In tourism and transportation, İGA Istanbul Airport was ranked first in Travel + Leisure’s 2025 list of the “World’s Best Airports.” İGA serves as a powerful promotional and branding asset for Türkiye’s narrative as a “global connectivity hub.”

BRICS: Strategic Diversification

New Paths in a Multipolar World: The BRICS Partnership (2024); Türkiye’s invitation in 2024 to join BRICS as a “partner country” is part of Ankara’s strategy to secure an autonomous position in a world order that is not solely Western-oriented. This move reflects Türkiye’s ambition to reinforce its bridge role between Eastern and Western economies and expand its maneuvering space on the global stage.

Türkiye’s application for BRICS membership is the most concrete example of its multipolar foreign policy rhetoric. While the fact that BRICS countries account for about 40% of global trade seems impressive, around 70% of Türkiye’s current trade partners are still EU and NATO member states.

In 2024, BRICS expanded to include countries such as Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. However, Türkiye’s inclusion would make it the only NATO member in a bloc led by Russia and China, dominated by the agendas of authoritarian regimes.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has stated that Ankara wishes to diversify its options regarding global alliances, also bringing up the long-standing goal of EU membership. This statement suggests that Türkiye’s interest in BRICS is, at least in part, a consequence of the stalemate in its EU relations.

A New Page in the Caucasus

One of Türkiye’s most significant diplomatic moves reflecting its long-term vision is the normalization process with Armenia. In 2022, special envoys were appointed to initiate normalization talks between Ankara and Yerevan. Former Ambassador to Washington Serdar Kılıç was appointed as Türkiye’s special envoy, while Ruben Rubinyan, Deputy Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, was appointed as Armenia’s envoy.

The normalization process gained new momentum following the Second Karabakh War. This development illustrates how shifting regional power balances have expanded Türkiye’s diplomatic opportunities. It also demonstrates that Türkiye is not solely focused on resolving current disputes but is actively exploring prospects for future regional cooperation.

The Zangezur Corridor issue is a prime example of Türkiye’s multi-dimensional diplomacy. By the end of 2024, consensus on the final text of a peace agreement had been reached in meetings held in Brussels, Moscow, and Tbilisi. While Armenia initially opposed the corridor, it has since adopted a more flexible stance in order to participate in economic integration.

This progress indicates that Türkiye’s patient and sustained diplomatic pressure is beginning to yield results. The planned corridor, which would connect two regions via road and rail, is expected to strengthen Türkiye’s direct link to Central Asia and enhance its geostrategic significance.

Opportunities

On December 8, 2024, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime abruptly reshaped a long-static landscape. Ankara and Riyadh took the first diplomatic step into the new Ankara-centered era by recognizing interim government leader Ahmed al-Sharaa. Türkiye is ready to expand cooperation with the new administration to address Syria’s security challenges, even offering to train Syrian security forces.

However, tensions persist: Israel’s airstrikes on Syria highlight the rapidly escalating contest for influence in the region between Türkiye and other actors. Nevertheless, with U.S. and European financial backing, the al-Sharaa administration is working to rebuild public service institutions, while Ankara and Riyadh are planning investments in social services and energy infrastructure.

Most recently, a Turkish consortium won the project to renovate and expand Damascus International Airport. Once the $4 billion project is completed, the airport will become one of the region’s largest destinations.

On the ground, however, the picture remains fragmented: the influence of groups like HTS (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham) continues to make it difficult for regional decision-makers to establish a unified will. Building a temporary political structure, achieving reconciliation among armed groups, and creating a coherent institutional framework pose a serious test for Türkiye’s governance capacity. Meanwhile, migration policy (in coordination with allies) is being reshaped. Directly connected to the presence of 2.9 million Syrian refugees, Türkiye is designing new balances of security and humanitarian diplomacy in both deportation measures and the improvement of living conditions.

Economic Anchor

Türkiye’s economy grew by 3.2% in 2024, and for 2025 the World Bank maintains its forecast at 3.1%, while the government projects growth in the 4–4.5% range. The IMF forecasts 3.0% growth for 2025 and has revised its inflation projection to 35.9%.

Inflation, which had peaked at 75% in May 2024, fell back to 38% by March 2025 and declined further to 33.5% in July. Thanks to coordination between the Treasury and the Central Bank, the goal is to reduce inflation to single digits by 2027. On the external financing front, development project funding reached $17.4 billion in 2023–24, with an additional $7 billion in financing guaranteed for 2025. Over the next three years, more than $40 billion in funding is targeted through the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the AIIB.

The current account deficit fell dramatically from $39.9 billion in 2023 to $10 billion in 2024 (about 0.8% of GDP). In parallel, portfolio investments climbed to $12 billion in 2024, while foreign direct investment remained steady at $4.7 billion.

In short, Türkiye’s diplomatic initiatives (particularly its openings toward Syria, the Gulf, and the Caucasus) rest on an economic foundation: dynamic growth, manageable inflation, accessible external financing, and a narrowing current account deficit. However, these balances are fragile; global financing conditions, domestic political stability, and geopolitical risks continue to test the management of both economic and diplomatic maneuvering.

Soft Power

Turkish TV dramas, now considered the world’s second-largest scripted series export after the U.S., combine with Ankara’s public diplomacy efforts to produce a softening effect on perceptions. This cultural appeal sometimes provides leverage at a much lower cost than hard power initiatives.

In recent years, Turkish television series have become a powerful cultural export, attracting not only local audiences but millions of viewers worldwide. By 2024, more than 300 series had been broadcast in 200 countries, generating over $500 million in export revenue. In 2022, this figure had been reported as $600 million, and over the following four years demand rose by a remarkable 184%.

By 2025, Turkish dramas had reached 146 countries, making Türkiye the world’s third-largest scripted series exporter after the United States and the United Kingdom. Today, these productions reach nearly one billion viewers, drawing a significant portion of the global population to the screen.

In Türkiye, an average of 60 series are produced each year. However, due to intense competition, roughly half end their run in fewer than 13 episodes. Nevertheless, the industry offers a unique format in global television markets: with around 45 production companies and 150 active directors, it maintains production capacity both domestically and internationally.

Some series have become cultural phenomena. Diriliş: Ertuğrul ran for five seasons with 150 episodes, and in its Netflix adaptation was expanded to 448 episodes, reaching a broad audience in about 60 countries. Binbir Gece (2006–2009) aired in 56 countries, from Latin America to the United States. Adını FerihaKoydum, completed in three seasons with 80 episodes, was exported to more than 70 countries, marking a remarkable success in global television history. Menekşe ile Halil, although lasting only 30 episodes, contributed to the wave of popularity in the Arab world known as the “Gümüş (Noor) effect.”

Not Cutting the Gordion Knot, but Unraveling It Thread by Thread

Türkiye’s “Gordion move” has become a symbol of the Global South’s defiance of the status quo. Purchasing the S-400 air defense system, challenging the West at the cost of expulsion from the F-35 program, or acting as a bridge between the West and Russia in the grain corridor are all manifestations of this strategy. Yet, this boldness is surrounded by economic vulnerabilities.

Türkiye’s quest for autonomy cannot be sustained without economic independence. Maintaining functional relations with the West should not mean sacrificing strategic freedom. In his speech at the Foreign Economic Relations Board’s (DEİK) 38th Ordinary Financial General Assembly and the “Respect for Masters” Awards Ceremony, President Erdoğan stated: “Türkiye is becoming a sought-after actor at peace tables. Today, Türkiye trusts and believes in itself, and moves towards its goals with self-confidence and steady steps.”

— a declaration of international recognition.

The fate of Gordion serves as a metaphorical caution for Ankara: once the knot is cut, the pieces drift in the air until new balances are established. Turkish diplomacy is now being tested on whether it can skillfully gather these pieces after making a decisive move. Türkiye’s 2025 strategy has shifted towards “flexible networks instead of rigid alliances” and “transactional interests instead of ideological claims.”

Not the Sword, but Patience

This time, the Gordion Knot is being untied not with a sword, but with patience. The risk lies in some of the strands (such as energy dependency, perceptions of the rule of law, and institutional capacity) snapping along the way. Ankara’s success depends on fine-tuning between hedging (maintaining simultaneous relations with different blocs to mitigate risk) and managing dependencies.

Ankara’s foreign policy transformation is a blend of realism, idealism, and optimism. This is both its perception and its reality. Türkiye offers an intriguing example of how a middle power can maneuver in a multipolar world. Yet, the structural constraints and contradictions it faces have not been sufficient to create a wholly negative perception.

The “Century of Türkiye” rhetoric is an effective tool for political mobilization. At the same time, important steps continue to be taken to strengthen the economic, technological, and institutional infrastructure needed to realize this vision. Turkish diplomacy is well aware that Türkiye’s future will depend less on the grandeur of its rhetoric and more on how successfully it overcomes these structural challenges.