Türkiye’s Nuclear Future: From Strategic Autonomy to Global Supply Partner

Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkish foreign policy has increasingly emphasized “strategic autonomy” – the ability to pursue national interests independent of any single great power patron. In practical terms, this has meant hedging b etween rival powers and adopting flexible alliances . Ankara maintains its commitment to NATO while simultaneously engaging robustly with non -Western powers, reflecting a pragmatic acknowledgement that 2 autonomy is a necessity for securing its future in a vo latile international system. Notably, Turkish policymakers have learned that true autonomy is not achieved through isolation or unilateralism. Erdoğan now emphasizes building bridges with allies and foes alike rather than burning them.

This bridge -buildin g strategy is evident in areas like energy, trade, and defense cooperation, where Türkiye seeks constructive relations across geopolitical divides. The result is a more transactional and multi -vector foreign policy ,in which Türkiye can leverage its unique geostrategic position – straddling Europe, Asia, and the Middle East – to act as an intermediary and solution partner in international crises. For example, Ankara has mediated conflicts such as the Ukraine grain export deal and sought dialogue in Middle E ast disputes, enhancing its reputation as a problem -solver in global diplomacy. In summary, strategic autonomy for Türkiye does not imply nonalignment or disengagement; rather, it means pursuing an independent course that maximizes national interests, rede fining alliances and strategic balances amid the world’s transformation toward multipolarity .

Nuclear Energy and Diplomacy: Bridging East and West

A clear manifestation of Türkiye’s strategic autonomy and bridge -building is its bold foray into nuclear en ergydiplomacy . In recent years, Ankara has positioned its nuclear energy program as a diplomatic and technological bridge between East and West . This is exemplified by its partnerships spanning Russia to the United States – powers often at odds – in pursu it of nuclear technology and investment.

Türkiye’s first nuclear power project, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant , is being built by Russia’s state -owned Rosatom under a groundbreaking build -own -operate model. The Akkuyu project, with four VVER -1200 reactors totaling 4,800 MWe capacity, is expected to produce around 10% of Türkiye’s electricity when fully operational . This collaboration with Moscow, a traditional rival of NATO, demonstrates Ankara’s willingness to cross old Cold War lines in pursuit of energy security and technological gains.

At the same time, Türkiye has sought closer nuclear cooperation with its W estern allies. In September 2025, during a high -profile visit to Washington, Turkish and U.S. officials signed a civil nuclear cooperation memorandum of understanding , signaling a “new phase” in bilateral relations on nuclear energy. The agreement – witnes sed by both nations’ leaders – aims to deepen collaboration on large -scale reactors and emerging small modular reactor (SMR) technology. This balanced approach solidifies Türkiye’s image as a “strategic hub” – one that can host Russian technology on NATO s oil and simultaneously align with Western governance standards – thus serving as a conduit of cooperation in an era of great -power competition.

Progress, Localization, and Future Projects

Ankara’s nuclear energy program has rapidly evolved from concept to reality, with significant progress at Akkuyu and concrete plans for additional plants. Akkuyu NPP , located on the Mediterranean coast, is on track to be Türkiye’s first operational nuclear power station. Construction beg an in 2018 , the first reactor unit received its initial fuel load in April 2023. Officials now anticipate the Unit 1 startup in 2025 –2026 , with the remaining three reactors

3 coming online by 2028. This timeline aligns with Türkiye’s goal of joining the leag ue of nuclear - powered nations before 2030 . Notably, the Akkuyu project has been a boon for domestic industry through rigorous localization efforts . Türkiye has leveraged this project to jump -start a domestic nuclear industry, achieving over 50% local conte nt and training a new generation of nuclear engineers. Turkish companies have supplied materials, engineering services, and labor for the massive undertaking, from civil construction to manufacturing of components. The Ministry of Energy reports plans to further raise local content by the time all four units are in operation . This heavy local involvement not only creates jobs and industrial value today, but also seeds a domestic nuclear supply chain for the future. Turkish industry is aiming to be positioned as a key player in the nuclear field , with the ultimate ambition of making Türkiye self-sufficient in all aspects of nuclear energy by 2053 – the republic’s centennial – and even exporting nuclear technology thereafter. Beyond Akkuyu, Türkiye i s actively planning additional nuclear power stations, reflecting a vision of nuclear energy as integral to its energy mix and diplomatic leverage . The government has identified Sinop ,on the Black Sea coast, and İğneada in the Thrace region (near the Bulg arian border), as sites for second and third nuclear power plants [18]. Each site is envisioned to host four large reactors, roughly similar in scale to Akkuyu. Unlike the exclusive Russia –Türkiye deal for Akkuyu, Ankara is exploring a consortium approach for these future projects. Turkish o fficials have engaged in negotiations with a range of potential partners, including the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia , to find the best offers in terms of technology, financing, and localization for Sinopand Igneada . Energy Minister Alpars lan Bayraktar indicated that Türkiye may pursue a trilateral model for the next plant – for instance, a partnership involving the U.S. and South Korea together. Indeed, in late 2025 Bayraktar noted discussions with leaders of South Korea, Canada, and Franc e about cooperation on both SMRs and conventional reactors , signaling a broad international outreach for nuclear development. This openness has already yielded proposals: in 2023, Korea’s KEPCO submitted a preliminary plan to build four APR -1400 reactors a t Sinop, and as of September 2023 Türkiye was in advanced talks with a Chinese company to construct a multi -unit plant in Thrace (İğneada), focusing on China’s Hualong One (HPR1000) reactor technology [24]. By entertaining offers from all major nuclear reactor exporters – from Russia’s VVER to Korea’s APR to China’s HPR, and pot entially Western designs – Türkiye enhances its bargaining power and ensures that its nuclear program is not tied to any single geopolitical bloc.

Crucially, Ankara has bolstered its nuclear governance and regulatory framework to support this expansion. In line with international best practices, Türkiye established an independent Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NükleerDüzenleme Kurumu, NDK) in July 2018. The NDK took over regulatory oversight from the old Turkish Atomic Energy A uthority (TAEK), which had a dual role and is now limited to radioactive waste management. This reform separated the promotional and oversight functions, strengthening confidence in the safety and transparency of Türkiye’s nuclear projects.

Such steps underscore that while Türkiye is diversifying its partnerships, it remai ns committed to international nuclear governance standards . The new regulatory regime, leveraging with external reviews (e.g. an IAEA nuclear infrastructure peer review in 2013), helps ensure that projects like Akkuyu meet rigorous safety criteria and that future reactors – regardless of whether they are Russian, Asian, or Western -supplied – will operate under a robust oversight framework.

This balance of openness to diverse partners with commitment to global norms reinforces Türkiye’s image as a responsib le emerging nuclear state, one that can bridge between different regulatory and technological philosophies (East and West) in the nuclear domain.

Energy Policy and Economic Sovereignty

Underpinning Türkiye’s nuclear push is a desire for greater economic sovereignty through energy independence. Türkiye is a large energy consumer heavily reliant on imports – as of 2022, about 75% of its energy supply was imported, including natural gas from Russia and Iran and oil from neighbors like Iraq. This dependency h as long been seen in Ankara as a strategic vulnerability, exposing the country to external pressure and price shocks. Thus, diversifying energy sources is at the core of Türkiye’s strategy to strengthen its autonomy.

Nuclear power offers a reliable, low -carbon baseload electricity source that can reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels (especially gas) and bolster energy security. The Akkuyu plant alone, when completed, will displace a significant portion of gas -fired generation, contributing to the gover nment’s goal of cutting back on gas imports (one -third of which currently come from Russia). Moreover, nuclear energy aligns with Türkiye’s climate commitments, such as its pledge to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2053 , by providing emissions -free po wer to support growing demand. In sum, investing in nuclear is as much an economic and strategic choice as it is an energy policy decision – it is meant to assure that Ankara can meet rising electricity needs and industrial growth without undue foreign dep endence, thereby asserting a greater degree of economic sovereignty in an uncertain global environment.

Beyond nuclear, Türkiye has pursued a broader role as an energy hub connecting continents , leveraging its geography to achieve strategic autonomy. For natural gas, Erdoğan’s government has revived plans to make Türkiye a transit and trading hub linking gas producers in the East (Central Asia, Middle East, Russia) with consumers in Europe [29]. Major pipeline projects – such as the Southern Gas Corridor bringing Azerbaijani gas to Europe, and the TurkStreampipeline carrying Russian gas to Türkiye and Southeast Europe – exemplify this approach.

Furthermore, economic diplomacy is visible in how Türkiye capitalizes on energy project s to deepen ties with various countries. The Akkuyu plant itself, beyond energy, has economic diplomacy value: it has strengthened Türkiye’s bilateral relationship with Russia (providing Moscow a long -term stake in Türkiye ’s energy stability), even as Anka ra navigates disagreements with Russia in other arenas (Syria, Libya, Ukraine).

Likewise, the budding nuclear cooperation with the United States and others provides new avenues for trade, investment, and strategic dialogue. International investors and go vernments are drawn by the scale of Türkiye’s energy market and its commitment to an “all -of-the-above” strategy. This includes not only nuclear, gas, and oil transit, but also renewable energy , where Türkiye has significantly expanded wind, solar, and geo thermal capacity in recent years.

The aim is to nurture homegrown industries in emerging and disruptive technologies – from artific ial intelligence to advanced materials – ensuring Türkiye is not left behind in the 4th Industrial Revolution. This push has already yielded results: Türkiye ’s tech startups are attracting international venture capital, and the country has produced multipl e “unicorn” companies in e - commerce, fintech, and gaming.

For international investors, Türkiye offers a large pool of educated youth, competitive manufacturing, and a gateway to regional markets – making it a compelling base for technology development an d export.

In the context of energy technology , Türkiye ’s capacity -building is evident in its local manufacturing of equipment for power plants, including nuclear. Turkish firms are supplying cement, steel, and electrical components to Akkuyu, proving their capability to meet stringent nuclear -grade standards. Türkiye is also investing in fuel fabrication research and nuclear medicine, seeking a foothold in those high -value niches. By 2053, as noted, Türkiye aspires to have a fully self -sufficient nuclear i ndustry.

Achieving this would mark Türkiye ’s transition from a net importer of energy technology to an exporter of energy solutions – a dramatic turnaround from the early 2000s when it was almost entirely dependent on external suppliers for advanced tech .

Every step in this direction enhances Türkiye’s economic sovereignty and reinforces its claim to be an equal stakeholder in international high -tech markets. It also allows Türkiye to offer solutions to global challenges – whether it’s providing affordable drones to help smaller nations bolster their security, or offering to build power infrastructure in energy -poor countries.

In essence, Türkiye is crafting a narrative of itself as a rising tech po wer from the developing world, capable of partnering with advanced economies but also helping lead the Global South into a more industrialized, self -reliant future.